

Global Structural Changes and Global Islamic Identity

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Abstract:

Globalization is slowly changing life and traditions of many people over the World, dramatically seeking changes in the traditional relationship between the community and people, creating a new sensibility and creativity in relationships between social groups. These changes necessarily require a new social and political model of organization for community, reorganizing and changing the nature of relationship between states. Effort to protect identity of people usually convey in the form of the fear of the subservient economic, cultural and political position in the process of globalization. This fear frequently produces powerful vibrations indicating the need of integration of social groups with the same or similar cultural identity, what opens up a new dimension of the internal political crisis between government and society. This crisis will produce particularly dramatic changes in Islamic world generating a powerful conflict between state and society in Islamic world, with unpredictable development of relations between Islam and West.

The development of new technologies and innovations lead to a new form of production. Factors of production have been moved from the traditional factors of production (capital-land-labor) to a new factors of global production (new knowledge, creative capital and labor mobilization, innovation, information). Within that form, production is becoming a more and more a globalized process which creates opportunities for less expensive and faster movement of people between regions, from one continent to another, for faster and less expensive transport, faster fluctuation of information between people, big social, political, cultural, racial and religious groups and communities, and for a rapid expansion of market liberalization. All of this leads to a fascinating bonding and mixing of different races, religions, cultures and traditions. The process of globalization leads to the establishment of new model of relations among people and state. This a new

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global model relations between people and state calls for a new form of legal regulation, new aspects of political integration and new moral and social standards. The creation of a broad spectrum of global interdependence will lead to a more expressed creation of a global economy and a new legal-political structure,¹ and to a greater cultural split in a more and more dependent and contradictory world.²

Technological changes, market liberalization, capital and labor mobility shall inevitably lead to liberalization of monetary and financial policies, which will move the process of decision-making from the state level to the influence on decision-making on global level. Growth of MNCs, IGOs, and NGOs, supranational regional and global institutions with mutual increasing interactions leads simply to the diffusion of state authority both upward and downward, creating new “plurilateral” global structural context, changing basic rules of the game in international relations, altering payoff matrices in rational decision-making, and modifying nature of state’s sovereignty.³ With the creation of a global structural context with the common regimes and common international regulatory frameworks, states reduce the cost; reduce uncertainty and risk; spread and share information; produce public goods which they cannot develop in isolation; and increase their collective effectiveness.⁴

The struggle for prestige on the world market is changing the political authority of states by shifting it towards industrial, commercial and market sectors, where many new non-state stakeholders exist (MNCs, IGOs, NGOs, international organizations, international commercial banks, global public media ...). That is why the prestige of state is shifting from military-political to technocratic-technological and economic-scientific fields. The more pronounced shifting of the center of power from the military-political quarter industrial, market and commercial sectors makes state as a hierarchical institutionalized bureaucratic-political structure unfit to meet the needs of the new form of participation on the global market. This requires a higher degree of flexibility than what is offered by an authoritative and strictly hierarchical system of a nation-state.⁵ New institutionalized network-forms of governance capable of providing faster and less expensive access to new technologies, more efficient breakthrough on major markets are needed, with more stable access to sources of capital and which will be able to overcome all limitations imposed by territorially organized system of a nation state. In this way the government would acquire the power to carry out economic policy which calls for a modification of market liberalization, financial and a global system of managing the free movement of capital and labor.⁶ The factors of production are more and more shifting towards *capital creative mobility, new knowledge and fast flow of information* leading to the internalization of production with a higher level of managed liberalization of the economy, finance and trade.

Global Identity and Cultural Conflict:

Global structural changes have defining role in multiplication of the relationship between the identities of various social groups, which would have a dramatic effect on the creation of a new global social order and new global cultural identity. The process of global structural changes brings a new mode of global cooperation, but also new kind of global conflict.⁷

Collective identity, which has been created through the development of common feeling and consciousness of the people belonging to the same linguistic and ethnic community that shares a common history and territory, common religion, common moral values and common practices of survival and existence,⁸ will find themselves facing with huge challenges in the 18th and 19th century. Development of the idea of nationalism, which has been primarily associated with the creation of the nation-state, national-bourgeois revolution in Europe moved concept of collective identity from "local heritage" to the concept of nation/state survival and to the "capitalistic" mode of production and distribution.

These changes lead to strong influence of organizational-political structure of state on the further development of ethnic, cultural and traditional components of collective identity.⁹ Through organizational-political structure of state, Western civilizations have established dominance over collective identities that have not gone through the bourgeois revolution without capitalist mode of production as dominant production model. The absence of state-political institution and capitalist mode of production in many traditional communities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, has lead to the making of a global colonial system in which a number of marginalized groups have been forced to borrow the identity of the colonizers, thereby repressing its own local - traditional identity. Process of political and social reforms that has been structured by global structural changes will generate a new relationship between individual and group that will greatly relax communication between state and people that require a new concept of collective identity.

A new collective identity is more structured on a new, broader concept of global production that urgently need persistent communication between different cultural, linguistic, racial and religious groups. On this concept of new global forms of production will cultivate sensitive relationship between global producers and local consumers, which call for frequent communication and a higher degree of tolerance and mutual respect between different ethnic, religious, racial and linguistic groups. Global production looks for a new concept of democracy, new generation of human rights and new social standards for minority groups. The nation-state in this process of global structural change is no longer capable of supporting the full capacity of the national economy, and a new global production. From this state's helplessness resulting dramatic decline in the collective identity of nation-state which is no longer able to effectively create and support the institutionalization of community identity that has historically been the result of

the regulatory and institutional state's action. Of course this does not preclude state to retain a portion of its exclusivity in the creation of identity, just as they are partially capable to regulate national economics within global market, especially when it comes to ethnically homogenous communities.¹⁰

The process of opening and changing of "local culture" will cause a dynamic debate whether globalization destroying cultural identity. The process of globalization of production also dramatically imposes necessity of mutual communication and mutual co-existence of different social groups, what greatly support the idea of liberal capitalism that has inevitably led to a dramatic booming of municipal multiculturalism, especially in large cities, and in the developed countries as more interconnected communities, as well.¹¹ By bringing in closer communication identities of various social groups, the process of globalization is changing the concept of isolated "local cultural identity", particularly of weak and the most vulnerable groups. In this context, the concept of "local cultural identity" is emerging as a main resonance of resistance to the process of globalization, but at the same time as broader social construction of global identity. This does not imply that globalization destroys localities but that cultural experience is in various ways 'lifted out' of its traditional 'anchoring' in particular localities. Cultural identity is less determined by location because location is increasingly penetrated by 'distance'.¹²

Transformation of production process from national to global economy, which has grown on the needs of new technological changes and sensitive communication between global producers and local consumers, has requested a new global market ideology (liberal Idea: liberal democracy and market capitalism)¹³ and new global identity. Those requirements directly led to functional disaggregation of nation-state. The functional disaggregation of state has resulted in discontinuity between locally-psychological and traditional values, on one side, and institutional-organizational aspect of the identity, on other side. This discontinuity between institutional-organizational and locally-psychological-traditional aspects of identity will lead to the process of deterritorialization of identity.¹⁴

This historical discontinuation between institutional (organizational) dimensions of identity (the state), and the psycho-social, traditional, cultural, religious identity (local culture), has resulted in dramatic political tensions around the world, particularly in multi-cultural communities. Psycho-sociological aspects of identity, although under strong influence of globalization, still remain attached to the local traditional, religious and cultural references. These references are changing slower than the organizational, political and economic references of identity which are primarily related to the institutional form of social organization of community.¹⁵

Psycho-sociological references of the identity (which are elevating identity through the local education system, traditional dressing, celebration of

local tradition, traditional food, the folk myths, legends and cults, etc.) are strongly associated with geographic and political designation of the community. This link between the institution (political-institutional and geographical determination of community) and the socio-cultural and psychological references (local culture) of "cultural identity" makes multiculturalism very fragile and unstable framework in the process of global structural changes.¹⁶ In this process cultural identity will be under strong pressure of conflict between state, as territorially limited institution, and globalization, as territorially unlimited process. Capitalist model of production encouraged nationalism by replacing class with national barriers and created centralized, linguistically homogeneous entities – nations in the process. Those same economic forces are now encouraging the breakdown of national barriers through the creation of a single, integrated world market.¹⁷

This process generates dramatic conflict between nation-state and process of globalization that lead to powerful process of disaggregation of state. Process of disaggregation of state leads to frequent communication between different cultures, traditions and religions that consequently attend to cultural synthesis with inclination to create larger communities with the same or similar cultural identity, what will necessarily change organizational and institutional model of social life - the state. This process of same-cultural integration will lead to unforeseeable conflict between institutional, political dimension of collective identity and socio-cultural and psychological dimension of "local culture" at the beginning of the 21st century.

In the process of structural changes, institutional and geographic determination of collective identity (the state) meet up with the new multinational external environment, with new forms of territorial-unlimited authority of supranational institutions, with a new form of supranational decision-making process, which has led to a process of disaggregation of state as institution and dissolution of geographical frame of state-identity. This will lead to opening of "local culture" that have remained unchanged across time in the "traditional societies"¹⁸ that has emerged as condition sine qua non for surviving and further developing dynamic culture of identity in the era of globalization.¹⁹

The process of disaggregation of nation-state in the process of global structural changes²⁰, leaves opened and largely unprotected system of reference of "local culture" causing "crisis of state's identity" at the end of 20th century. Fear of absorption of "local cultural identity", and the need for more fluent global flows of capital, labor, information, and a higher degree of sensitivity between global producers and local consumers, will cause intensive vibrations in creating a new and broader cultural and political agglomerations with same or similar cultural references and makes more comfortable environment for "local cultural identity". These agglomerations should provide more effective cooperation, rapid ideas and capital locution, which has more sense for higher level of socio-economic modernization on the individual level. This process of social and economic

modernization at the individual level raises the level of social cohesion within these a new associations, what makes cultural identity one of the most important factors of global integration, and new global political divisions.²¹

The fear of inferiority or superiority of others, mistrust and difficulties in communications with others, lack of motivation to cooperate with others who are different, increasingly pushed towards a broader interconnection with similar or the same cultural, traditional, linguistic and religious references. Due to larger integration of the same or similar "local cultures", the fear of failure and fear of survival, fear of economic or technological lagging behind other developed communities in the global process of integration, has been significantly decreased. The confidence for more intensive communication between the same or similar cultures provides "economic legitimacy" for this new global integration framework, which takes place faster, more effective, with fewer obstacles, capital, labor, ideas and information fluctuations, which are the fundamental prerequisite of globalization.

Possibilities to get integration of "local cultures" with the same or similar cultural identity, with less fear of own inferiority, with less fear of the potential danger of absorption by others powerful cultures and agglomerations, largely provide "political legitimacy" for process of integration "identical or similar local cultures".

However, in process of integration of "identical or akin local identities", "socio-democratic legitimacy" of this process of integration remains deeply problematic. This legitimacy of identity can be identified only at the level of the resulting overall welfare and development of democratic structures in this integration process, and possibilities to provide faster income of mobile factors of production, to assure a higher degree of compatibility between global production and local consumption, and the level of effectiveness of democratic institutions. Hence, economic, political and social-democratic processes in global integration have been making of global structure, within which global interest and global identity has been created.

Global structural changes will make the conflict between institutional/geographical and psycho/sociological aspects of identity, more as a conflict between the state and "local culture", or in other words, conflict between government and society, which will move this internal conflict of cultural identity into global "identity crisis of the state". This crisis will be particularly emphasized welcome in Islamic World, and will create latent conflict between the Islamic and the Western civilizations.

Global Identity of Islam:

According the opinion of one group scholars, economic, political and cultural changes in late 20th Century, didn't have a major effect on the internal

relations between the political and the cultural/ religious structure in Islamic world. Ernest Gellner will emphasize that the process of secularization in industrialized society has not found much response in the Islamic community, moreover, the influence of Islam on the feelings and beliefs of his followers has increased.²² The other group of prominent scholars, comes to the conclusion that global changes in the late 20th century, had a significant impact on the creation of ideas about the necessity of changing the relationship between political and the cultural/religious structure in Islamic world. Famous Saudi Islamology Abubaker A. Bagader professor at King Abdul Aziz University, studying Islamic ideal in historical context have emphasized that the main problem in Islam is not the awareness that the Islamic community have to be changed. The main question is: what kind of change and the speed with which these changes are supposed to be done, and what the way to realize it is. And while some appeal to the gradual and peaceful change preferring education, social activity of the masses and their active participation in political life, the respect and appreciation of the legal system and the state as a guarantor of peace and order, others are looking for faster and violent revolutionary change with the establishment of a new global Revolutionary Islamic regime.²³ According to this view, the contemporary crisis of the territorial identity of the state has caused intensive cultural vibration in Islamic countries that have made dramatic confrontation between state and society in Islamic world.

Global structural changes call for new horizons of fluctuations of capital, labor, information and creative linking of new knowledge and technology, which leads to a major crisis of the international relations, seeking a new global order in which the state has no longer central role in the creation of interest and identity of the groups. Historically state in the Islamic world have been agent of interests of foreign capital rather than agent of interactions between the identity and interests in Islamic community, that will lead to a serious identity crisis of the state in Islamic world. As the individual and group identity in Islam is primarily associated with the identity of the global Islamic community of believers (*umma*) but not with the territorial-political identity of Islamic state (*Watan*), whose borders were decreed by the former colonial powers, “territorial identity crisis of state” in the Islamic world will be automatically transferring into internal conflict between state and society in Islam.²⁴ Remarkable complexity of this conflict is going to create a new fragile relationship between Islamic and Western civilization often on the brink of conflict between Islam and West.

The state in the Islam has failed to open a process of modernization of Islamic society and has failed to incorporate Islamic state in modern capitalist mode of production. Due to the inability of the state to include the Islamic community in the process of modernization, will cause great social frustration in the Islamic society that will further push the identity of Islamic state to the global Islamic community of believers (*umma*). In this process Islamic Revival Movement and process of purification of Islam, become one of the biggest challenges to the identity of the nation-state in Islamic world in late 20th and early 21st century.

As “group’s identity” has a meaning that cultural identity is derived from social and political interactions and specific interests of the community,²⁵ the identity of Islam has grown up into global political identity. Therefore “identity crisis of the state” in Islam will be automatically generating a new dynamic political vibrations in relations between Islam and the West. Any inclination towards a global integration of Islam will be seen as a global threat to liberal democracy of the West and to international order.²⁶

Global structural changes will lead to formation of a new global order in which the global community have a propensity to generate a new global interests and new culture of identity. Within this new culture of identity the position and the role of Islamic identity will be designed on the structure of global relationships in the new global order. What kind of global relationships will be developed in this new global order, primarily depend on whether the new global order will be dominated by "Collective Identity of Violence" (The Hobbesian culture), by “Collective Identity of Rivalry” (The Lockean culture), or by “Collective Identity of Friendships ”(The Kantian culture). In those prospects it is possible to conceive two models of structural relations between Islam and the West in the future.

One of those concepts has seen the relationship between Islam and the West inherently in the form of anarchic Hobbes' (Hobbesian) "culture of conflict". In this concept of globalization, market economy, new flows of capital, new ideas, new technology, and new social and political relations between nations, are strictly interlinked in global community. From this perspective, globalization is defined in technological and socio-economic determinism. Within this framework a new social environment with the new model of techno-culture, new community identity, a new triumph of free market, new model of democracy and new generation of human rights and freedoms, have been required. Such determination of globalization opens up new opportunities for further development of democratization, a new model of communication, education, culture, and the growth of many other social benefits which are arising from the global structural changes, which necessarily requires a changing of philosophical and cultural matrix of identity, which is on the path of global integration.

Proceeding from the technological-economic determinism of globalization, a group of Western scholars believe that this concept of globalization inherently excludes Islam as an equal participant in this process. In accordance to this view recent years have seen a revival of the neo-Weberian attribution of economic prosperity to religious thought. In this new interpretation Islam has been seen as an inhibitor of economic development. In this view Muslims are the most “antimarket” people.²⁷ For them, the process of globalization is a combination of technological, economic, social, ideological, and cultural factors that make a unique homogenized matrix of large corporations in developed nations and global institutions with which Islam, with his inner social restrictions and cultural inhibitions, is not compatible with this process.²⁸ For this group scholars, identity of Islam, which is devoted to the glorification of force and

violence, that is embedded into the very philosophy and practice of Islam, is not compatible with the requirements arising from the process of globalization. These authors underline that relationship between globalization and Islam is a relationship of permanent mutual resistance, repression and restrictions.²⁹

Mostly Islamic scholars, who depart from the cultural dimension of Islam. In Islam democracy has been seen as the rule of God's law but not the law of man. "The belief in the Unity and Sovereignty of Allah is the foundation of the social and moral system propounded by the prophets. It is the very starting point the Islamic political philosophy. The basic principle of Islam is that human beings must, individually and collectively, surrender all rights of over lordship, legislation and exercise of authority over other. To Allah no one should be allowed to pass orders or make commands on his own right and no one ought to accept the obligation to carry out such commands and obey such orders. None is entitled to make laws on his own behalf and none is obliged to abide by them. This right vests in Allah alone".³⁰ The principles of "*shura*" are obligatory principles and the main sources of Islamic ethics. *Shura* is basically a consultative decision-making process that is considered either obligatory or desirable by different scholars. Those who choose to emphasize the *Quranic* verse "and consult them on the matter" (3:159) consider *shura* as obligatory, but those who emphasize the verse praising "those who conduct their affairs by counsel" (43:38) consider *shura* as merely desirable. There is no doubt that *shura* is the Islamic way of making decisions, but is it obligatory? Does a government that does not implement a consultative process become illegitimate? No decisive answer to this question has been found.³¹

In accordance of the Islamic law sovereignty belongs only to the God, who transfers the sovereignty to the people. Every individual and group has a duty of loyalty to God and not to the state to which they belong.³² Absolute personal sovereignty of God in Islam means the sovereignty is extending where Muslims live. The relationship between Islam and non-Islamic states seem conflicting and incompatible with the process of globalization.³³ By opinion of this group of lawyers, social scientists, and ethicists, "sovereignty of God" is a universal and transcendent principle of Islamic jurisprudence and political theory, which makes an essential distinction between Western liberal democracy and Islam. In this opinion incompatibility of Islam and liberal democracy is apparent.

In this concept the relationship between Islam and the West is a concept of "culture of hostility" with mutually exclusive identity of both Islamic and Western civilization.

Another concept of relationship between identities of Islam and Western civilization is based on the changes that occur as a result of global structural changes and impact of these changes on the interests and identity of these civilizations. According to this view the importance of Islam in global relations in the near future will not be so determined by geostrategic position of Islamic

countries on whose territory there are huge deposits of natural non-renewable resources – oil. The nature of the relationship between Islam and the West will be changed. In the process of global structural changes, Islam becomes more and more important as a system of cultural values of 1.5 billion people in the world. Hence the interest of the West to cooperate with Islam is increasingly moving from the geo-strategic position of Islamic countries, as a source of oil, to the capacity of absorption (consumers) of the Islamic world. Those changes of interest, which comes from new relationship between global producers and local consumers, necessarily lead to a new relationship between Islam and the West. In this new relationship of mutual interests and cooperation between Islam and the West, the nature of relationship between these civilizations will be significantly altered.

In this prospect of the future development of relations in the global community, the relationship between Islamic and the Western civilization, will be considerably based on the concept of “culture of tolerance and cooperation”, and principles of nonviolence, and the interests for mutual respect will prevail. Faster and more fluid communication between different identities with less fear of domination over each other, cooperation between Islam and the West would be more efficacious and more peaceful.³⁴

Islam: From Cultural to Political Identity:

Political influence of the West on Islam in the past has been generally leaned on the legacy of colonialism in Islamic countries. Internal religious traditional fragmentation of Islam (*Sunni* and *Shiia* Islam),³⁵ and influence of Islam as a religion on internal political and social processes, has moved Islamic world behind of the influence of social and political changes which has affected the international community in the 19th and 20th century.

Influence of the West in Islamic countries had a direct impact on social and cultural stratification of Islamic community, resulting in a lack of fundamental social changes, which prevented the formation of national identity in these countries. Secular nationalism, which sporadically appeared in the form of liberal and Arab nationalism, failed to create prosperous and powerful communities in Islamic world. “The secular national ideologies and movements that rallied millions across the Arab worlds in the immediate post-colonial era – Nasserism, Ba’thism, and their corollaries, Arab nationalism and Arab unity – have failed. The old ideologies of nationalism, socialism and National Socialism, bequeathed by nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe, have lost their magic and even become discredited. They have failed to deliver on their promises of national strength, social and economic development, and political freedom”.³⁶

Authoritarian governments in Islamic countries, which are mainly relying on outside political support and on fragmentation in Islam,³⁷ never had political and religious authority for radical social reform of Islamic community.

Corrupt and repressive military and police apparatus in Islamic countries, which largely depended on both military and political support of the West, didn't

have capacity and legitimacy to undertake measures of internal social, political and economic reforms. "Since independence_ the Arab countries have been largely governed by various forms of authoritarian rule: military-bureaucratic dictatorships, single-party state hegemonies, or traditional monarchic autocracies. This pattern was interrupted only briefly by a few short-lived experiments with representative democracy that soon succumbed to what is 'normal'. Today there is hardly a single Arab country that warrants the appellation 'democratic' in the Western scene. The reality of present day Arab Muslim politics is best characterized as hegemonic state structures superimposed on emasculated civil societies".³⁸ Powerlessness of governments in Islamic countries to bring the community to a higher level of economic development, to reduce the gap between extremely wealthy and extremely poor segments of the population, to eliminate corruption in these countries, will increase strength and influence of Islamic Militant Movements. Strengthening of Islamic Militantl Movements on the political scene in Islamic world has been result more lack of skills and interests of Islamic political elites to create a modern social and economic program in Islamic countries,³⁹ than result of growing influence of Islamic Militant Movements in Islamic World.⁴⁰

During the Cold War secular nationalism was increasing in the Islamic world and has become a big threat to the Islamic regimes. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, cooperation of Islamic regimes with governments of Western countries will occupy a central place in the program of Islamic Militant Movements, which will recognize in this cooperation the main opportunity for successfully confrontation with the pro-Western oriented regimes in Islamic countries.⁴¹

The change of focus in program of the Islamic Militant Movement will make a huge confusion in strategy of political opposition in Islamic countries and in strategy of New Islamic Revival Movements. This confusion will be visible in the Islamic world, especially after the outbreak of war against "global terrorism" on the beginning of this century. In that period New Islamic Revival Movements will found itself facing with great historical challenges. Islamic modernism and revival are two of the many intellectual responses, operating within an Islamic framework, to Western colonial influence and to the eighteenth-century political decline of Muslim powers. Islamic modernists, while acknowledging with varying degrees of criticism or emulation, the technological, scientific and legal achievements of the West, aimed to overcome a perceived impasse in the development of Islamic societies. Islamic revivalists objected to Western colonial exploitation of Muslim countries and the imposition of Western secular values. They aimed to reassert 'original' Islamic values. Islamic modernist ideas promoted a re-interpretation of Islam which would fit in with the modern world. For many modernists the reason why Islam globally declined is in the lack, in Muslim countries, of a modern and dynamic understanding of science. Islamic modernists while condemning European colonial aggression and opposing its political

domination of Muslim countries, called for reforms in the educational field. Modern curricula combine religion with modern sciences is voiced to acquire the tools of modern science to combat the West.⁴²

New Islamic Revival Movements are both a response to the conditions of modernity- to the centralization of state power and the feeble development of capitalist economies-and a cultural expression of modernity in Islamic countries. The emphasis upon Islamic values is not intended as a return to some past era but represents an effort to cope with contemporary problems by renewed commitments to the basic principles, though not the historical details, of Islam.⁴³

However, the global war on terrorism will unfold in the main support for centralized authoritarian state in Islamic countries that will weaken the possibilities of democratic reform with the grave threat for further development free and democratic elections in the Islamic world. It will worsen the position of the Islamic world in the global democratic changes. "Democracy promotion policies in Islamic world also reflect a lack of understanding. The equation of democratic reforms with free parliamentary elections assumes the intrinsic legitimacy of formal political institutions as an arena in which national actors can negotiate interests and resolve conflicts facing the community. Yet every survey conducted in Muslim societies, including Arab, non-Arab, African, and Asian countries, suggests that they harbor deep and widespread suspicion of formal political authority. This suspicion is unlikely to disappear with the democratization of the political process. Throughout Islamic history, political leaders have not enjoyed the esteem granted to religious scholars, tribal chiefs, or mystics who kept a distance from state power. One lesson to be drawn from Iraq, is that the formal political process, which privileges the majority rule over traditional consensus, might not be the best mechanism for negotiating divisive substantive issues. Religious councils, tribal chiefs, charismatic leaders, local assemblies, and similar informal bodies can be more effective in reinforcing political legitimacy through popular consultation, negotiation, and concessions "⁴⁴

The war against global terrorism will increasingly reinforce the position of oppressive authoritarian regimes in Islamic countries. Strengthening the position of the oppressive regimes in Islamic countries will open up more opportunity for stronger and more open actions of Islamic Militant Movement, which led to domination of radical streams in New Islamic Revival Movements. This process will lead to more and more visible dangerous coalition between Islamic Militant Movements and New Islamic Revival Movements that will further lock up of the possibility of democratic changes in Islam. The risk from this coalition within Islam will support further strengthening of the alliances between the authoritarian regimes in Islamic countries and governments of Western countries under the semblance of combatting "Islamic terrorism" that will lead to more pronounced confrontation between Islamic Militant Movement and authoritarian ruling regimes in Islamic countries.

This intra-Islamic confusion will get indication of the wider international confrontation between Islam and West, that will obtain special implication after the terrorist attacks of Islamic terrorist's network All Qaeda on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, and after the invasion of the USA and Great Britain in Iraq (2003-2011), that lead to the escalation of political tensions between West and Iran, with dramatic effects in Islamic community. This intra-Islamic political perplexity in early 21st century can certainly be labeled as the worst stage in relations between Islam and West in history.⁴⁵

The New Islamic Revival Movements in its political and social program primarily rely on systematic rationalization of Islamic doctrines, institutions and practices in the implementation of Islamic law (Sharia), interpreting Islam as a symbiosis of beliefs, rituals, ideology and politics, with a comprehensive impact of Sharia on the overall life of the individual and the community. "In general, the Islamic renewal movement comprises four broad groups. Proponents of "civic Islam" include civil society organizations that advocate women's equality, human rights, social responsibility, environmental protection, and similar social issues but make no overt claim to political power. Referring to the progressive teachings of Islam, they call on regimes to enact reforms and respect basic rights. Proponents of "Islam and democracy" include parties and movements that see no incompatibility between Islamic values and teachings and modern democratic principles. This group advocates participation in the political process with the goal of achieving power and applying political reforms on the basis of Islamic principles. Proponents of "reforms within Islam" include leading religious figures, scholars, and academic institutions that call for reinterpretation of Islamic laws, a historical reading of Islam and the Qur'an, and the modernization of Islamic knowledge. "Culturally modern Islam" developed mainly among Muslim communities living in the West. These Diaspora groups and organizations, which try to articulate a "western Islamic identity," see no tension between being a Muslim and a citizen of a western democracy. Tying these diverse actors together is their commitment to modernize Islamic institutions, traditions, and practices."⁴⁶

Decisive goal of these movements will remain the preservation of the identity of the Islamic world, political and social reconstruction of the Islamic community, and a rejection of the cultural and political influence of the West in the Islamic countries. "Today, however, the major battle is over the soul of Islam and will require substantive, normative, and institutional reforms. The outcome of this religious and ideological contest will be determined by the balance of power and influence between radical Islamists, bent on imposing a puritanical form of Islam through intimidation and violence, and moderate Muslims who aim to renew Islam from within."⁴⁷ Drawing social power primarily from middle social classes New Islamic Revival Movement with its political agenda has attracted sympathy primarily young generation of highly educated people. "As a strategy, "Islamic renewal" can bring coherence to a significant but scattered cluster of Muslim reformist ideas and tie them to a social and political agenda that includes reform

of family codes to give women equal rights; revisions of textbooks to teach human rights and religious pluralism; and modernization of Islamic charities, schools, and consultative traditions. The movement is already a fact on the ground. Various influential Arab and Muslim reformists, including secular human rights and women's groups, consider modernist Islamic values as a means to advocate broad-based social and political change"⁴⁸ Through the activity of these movements young people have found opportunity for their political actions which are directed towards political and social changes in the Islamic world.

Two hypotheses have prevailed in the strategy of the Islamic Militant Movement. The first hypothesis emphasized that the West was now more willing to fight on the side of the rich against the poor to have easier access to Islamic oil. The proponents of this hypothesis pointed out that in order to implement this strategy, the West's military presence in Islamic countries are now more visible than it was during the Cold War. The second hypothesis, which is widely exploited and used actively in the global strategy of Islamic Militant Movement, proclaimed that Western countries are more inclined to intervene in conflicts within the Islamic world and to solve internal problems of Islamic society, while abstaining to be involved in conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims, in which Muslims suffer.⁴⁹

Using these two hypotheses Islamic Militant Movement will gain sympathy in the wider population in the Islamic world, which will push the Islamic Revival Movement from social and democratic reforms to strategy of internal political struggle. This change of program of the Islamic Revival Movement will result in marginalization of social changes in its program and strategy, what will further deepen of internal social contradictions in Islamic countries, that will promote sectarian confrontation in Islamic countries. These processes in the Islamic world in particular will come to the fore after the so-called. "Arab spring", will lead to the political confrontation, but not to social transformation and democratic changes in Islamic World. It will move Islamic identity from cultural and social references to political references that might be one of the main obstruction for successful inclusion of Islam in global structural changes.

Islam between "Global Identity" And Democratization:

Welfare and social reform in the Islamic world have had the most importance of spreading the cultural influence of this civilization from the earliest days of its creation. The whole history of Islamic civilization is characterized by permanent renewal (*tajdid*) reform (*Islah*), and renaissance (*Nahda*) of this great religion and civilization. In the early stage of Islam egalitarianism and democratic dimensions of social and human equality, which has been especially promoted in the speeches of the Prophet Muhammad (Hadith), was accentuated. With the expansion of Islam, as the dominant empire of the Middle Ages, in the areas inhabited by people with different cultural identities, need for a high degree of flexibility of Islamic canons was apparent, which will lead to a real renaissance in

reinterpreting the Qur'an and the practice of Islam (Sunna). In the interpretation of the Qur'an had been induced different schools of Islamic jurisprudence, such as *Hanafi*, *Hanbali*, *Maliki* and *Shafi'i*, within Sunni Islam, and *Jafari* within Shi'a Islam.

A special significance in the political philosophy of Islam was developing different social categories such as the category of common goods (*maslaha`amma*), the category compassion (*rahmah*), the category of human welfare (human welfare - *masali'h al-'Ibad*), the categories protection of religious minorities (*ahl al-dhima*), social justice ('*adl*), and numerous other social institutions which will outline the specific identity of Islam as a global philosophical, political and social concept. These social categories have linked Islam with the modern philosophical and humanitarian concept of modern society, from the earliest days of its development. Through developing the principles of consensus (*ijma'*) and methods of consultation (*Shura*) in decision-making processes, which were founded on the legal system (*Haqq*), the system of invention (*talfiq*), and the model of reasoning based on the principles of analogy *Qur'anic* verses (*kiyas*), *ijtihad*, as the process of interpreting the Qur'an and independent decision-making, growing into a defining component of the identity of Islamic culture as a modern political-philosophical concept of democracy. Although the Qur'an did not specify a particular form of government, but system of social and political standards, which had to be followed by all Muslims, were specified. Among such values designed by the Qur'an are: the promotion of social cooperation and mutual assistance in pursuit of justice, the establishment of a consultative and non-autocratic method of governance, and the institutionalization of mercy and compassion in social interactions. Therefore, it would stand to reason that Muslims ought to adopt the system of government that is the most effective in helping Muslims to promote this system through the moral venues facilitated by Islamic law and ethics".⁵⁰

Large territorial and political transformation of the Islamic world after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, will dictate the appearance of modern Islamic states that regulates mutual political relations on the principles of territorial and political sovereignty of state in accordance with the norms of secular public international law and international relations.⁵¹ However, the territorial and political changes in the Islamic world had not been accompanied by compatible changes in the internal jurisprudence and legal tradition of Islam. These changes will create a dichotomy between international legal norms and standards of internal legal jurisprudence of Islam, that will generate moral and ethic dichotomy between Islam and West.⁵²

Although many aspects of the political relations between Islamic countries was governed by secular international legal norms, the Islamic identity is still intimately associated with global Islamic community (*umma*), rather than with the state as it was case in Western civilization. Many aspects of human rights, women rights, marital rights, divorce, inheritance rights, and the rights of the child, are

still to be governed by Islamic law and traditions of Islam, which is often interpreted in the West as part of Sharia law, which remains incompatible with secular legal system of the West.

“*Shari'ah* is God's way; it is represented by a set of normative principles, methodologies for the production of legal injunctions, and a set of positive legal rules. As is well known, *Shari'ah* encompasses a variety of schools of thought and approaches, aloof which are equally valid and equally orthodox. Nevertheless, *Shari'ah* as a whole, with all its schools and various points of view, remains the way and law of God. The *Shari'ah*, for the most part, is not explicitly dictated by God. Rather, *Shari'ah* relies on the interpretive act of the human agent for its production and execution. Paradoxically, however, *Shari'ah* is the core value that society must serve. The paradox here is exemplified in the fact that there is a pronounced tension between the obligation to live by God's law and the fact that this law is manifested only through subjective interpretive determinations. Even if there is a unified realization that a particular positive command does express the Divine law, there is still a vast array of possible subjective executions and applications. This dilemma was resolved, somewhat, in Islamic discourses by distinguishing between *Shari'ah* and *fiqh*. *Shari'ah*, it was argued, is the Divine ideal, standing as if suspended in mid-air, unaffected and uncorrupted by the vagaries of life. The *fiqh* is the human attempt to understand and apply the ideal. Therefore, *Shari'ah* is immutable, immaculate, and lawless - *fiqh* is not”.⁵³

This legal dichotomy between International Law and Islamic jurisprudence and dichotomy between ethic, tradition and moral Islamic values, which must be followed by all Muslims, from one side, and ethic, moral and traditional values of Western democracy, from other side, will lead to the creation of a general understanding in the West, that every demand of the masses in the Islamic countries to change the social and political agenda in Islamic community through the imposing form of government which could exert social and political values of Islamic polity, does not mean anything than to establish the legitimacy of global conservative Islamic government and impose Sharia Law. With such judgment, which dominates in western political and academic thoughts, each distinction between the ideology of Islamic Revival Movement and the conservative ideology of the Militant Islam will be removed.⁵⁴ This often leads to build up of parity between Islamic Revival Movement and Islamic Militant Movements, which makes social and political changes in Islamic countries practically impossible.

Al Qaeda's terrorist attack on New York and Washington, and declaration of war on global terrorism, war in Afghanistan, U.S. and GB invasion in Iraq, tense relations between USA and Arab League, permanently delay resolving biblical conflict between Palestinians and Israel, tensions between the West and Iran regarding Iran's intentions to produce nuclear weapons(?),⁵⁵ will reinforce the alliances between New Islamic Revival Movement and Islamic Militant Movements, increasingly opting to the common struggle against the Anglo-

American presence in the Islamic world. This will lead the West and the Islamic world in perceptible mutual global confrontation at the beginning of the 21 century.

An ongoing support of Western liberal democratic governments to the autocratic regimes in Islamic countries, that makes impossibility of peaceful democratic social and political transformation of the Islamic countries, will build the democratic Islamic Revival Movements dangerously close to Islamic Militant movements, who are becoming a powerful factor on the political scene of the Islamic community. In new political environment only Islamic Militant Movements offer a promising options for social and political changes in the Islamic world.⁵⁶

These details in internal relations in the Islamic countries and military support from the Western countries to oppressive Islamic regimes will preserve the conservative Islamic systems. "By monopolizing all legitimate political activity, the governing elites pre-empted participatory politics and created a vacuum that the Islamists, as the sole leading opposition group, could fill. The lack of democracy in the region has patently served to fuel the Islamist movements."⁵⁷ The necessity of mutual cooperation and integration between Islamic countries, what is induced by the process of global structural changes in the era of globalization, will make the radical movements in Islamic countries capable to successfully create a link between unavoidability elimination of autocratic regimes in Islamic countries and the necessity of intensive mutual connecting between the Islamic countries, what will make Islamic Militant Movement powerful factor in turbulent processes in the Islamic world in the early 21st century.

The main goal of Islamic Militant Movements is to open a global confrontation between West and Islamic world and to weaken relationship between West and authoritarian regimes in Islamic countries. The main aim of Islamic Radical Movement is primarily to encourage the brutality of those who govern Islamic countries, and create anger for those who are suffering in the Islamic world and so challenge the legitimacy of the Islamic ruling autocratic regimes. To create a contrast between the poor rebellion people, to provoke more brutality of ruling military and political elites and family dynasties, which have undoubtedly enjoyed the unreserved military support of Western countries, is the main strategic goal of Islamic Militant Movements.

Another strategic goal of Islamic Militant Movements is certainly to encourage extensive actions against the basic human rights and freedoms. The right of each human being is to enjoy freedom of movement, to enjoy the right of free and fair trial, the right of not to be considered as terrorists. Nobody can be treated as second class citizen just because he or she belongs to another confessional, cultural or racial origin. The goal of Islamic Militant Movement is to discredit the concept of Western democratic society in the eyes of the Islamic

world, to open cast doubt in the democratic proclamations of the West and to discredit the legitimacy of the West to intervene in internal affairs of Islamic community in the name of democratic rights and freedoms. Long queues of citizens in front of the police stations in USA, waiting on the criminal investigation with the obligatory humiliating giving blood samples, photographing and fingerprinting, only because they belong to the tradition and culture of Islam (after 9/11), have made Islamic Militant Movements more powerful and more homogeneous in Islamic world than ever before.⁵⁸

Trying to keep oil resources in Islamic countries under own economic and political control, the West has decided to cultivate good relationship with authoritarian and corruption-prone regimes in Islamic countries. By establishing close relationship with autocratic regimes in Islamic countries, the West's hopes to reduce power of Islamic Radical Movements and thereby encourage the development of liberal democracy in these countries. Such policies will soon prove to be disastrous both for the development of democracy in Islamic countries and for further relationship between the West and the Islamic world. Political and military support that the West provides to authoritarian and vicious regimes in these countries are increasingly deteriorating liberal and democratic movements in an Islamic world, which is moving closer and closer to Military Islamic Movements. Such policy and strategy of the West toward Islamic oil rich countries has resulted in poor part of Islamic world into political disaster in which the most prosperity has been opened for Islamic Military Movements have come in power. In this way a new coalition between Islamic Military Movement and New Islamic Revival Movement become has more and more visible. The struggle for profit and political power has destroyed any possibility for democratization of the Islamic countries.⁵⁹

The coalition of authoritarian regimes in Islamic countries and the Western government has been encouraged after terrorist assault of 9/11. This coalition will further deepen the gap between illiterate, poor, disenfranchised and desperate people and militarily powerful state's corrupted bureaucracy in Islamic countries. This will be a closed circle of poverty, misery, rebellion and violence that will be used by the Islamic Militant Movements in its struggle for power in the Islamic countries.

In this coalition of Western governments and the ruling autocratic regimes in Islamic countries, in order to prevent Islamist Militant Movement to come in power, the right of the West to appear as a protector of democracy in the Islamic world, would be destroyed.

The conflict between Islamic Militant Movement and Western governments is growing up into the most powerful challenge to human rights and freedoms, currently as one of the greatest threat to further interactions between the Islamic and Western civilization. Today, Islamic Militant Movements serve to hegemonic pretensions of Western countries, as justification for its military

intervention in the Islamic countries in order to prevent Islamic Militant Groups to come in power in Islamic countries. On the other hand, pretensions of the Western countries to control economic and political processes and prevent political changes in Islamic countries will be the "legitimate" basis for actions and strengthening of Militant Islamic Movements. This conflict is going to be "closed circle of violence" against the fundamental human rights and freedom, what leads to the affirmation of domination of "culture of violence" In the West and Islam.

Concluding Remarks:

Global structural changes have caused dramatic changes in both Western world and in Islamic community. Can these changes affect the change of identity in relationship between Islam and the West? This issue is essentially an indication of the political and cultural tensions that are now appearing in the interaction between the process of globalization and Islam, However, this question also induces the necessity of cooperation between the West and the Islamic world.

The process of globalization has fundamentally changed the way of the life and traditions in Islamic community from Morocco to Indonesia, from Gambia to Uzbekistan, dramatically altering the relationship between the group and the individuals, introducing a new sensibility and creativity in relationships between social groups as well as individuals themselves. Possibility to achieve frequent communication between individuals and groups, by using mobile phones, internet, fax, satellite, cable TV, face-book, twitter, a skype, and possibilities for cheaper and faster movement people from one region to another one, are significantly changing way of thinking of people, dramatically influencing their traditional value system, which necessarily requires a new social and political organization of Islamic communities. This automatically led to changes of nature of the relationship between Islam and the West.

The necessity of global economic and political cooperation intensifies the question of cultural identity in a global environment.⁶⁰ The Concern for the preservation of group identity is manifested in the form of fear of subordinated economic, cultural and political position of the group in the process of globalization. In Islam, this fear produces dramatic political demand indicating the need of integration in global Islamic community. This claim opens a new dimension of the internal political crisis between the government and society in the Islamic countries. This inner conflict between state and society in the Islamic world contains different essence than the internal conflict between state and society on the West. Tendency of Islam to be integrated into a single Islamic community is the most controversial dimension of processes of globalization today. These processes produce one of the most profound "crisis of state identity" in Islamic world, and the "crisis identity of relations between Islam and the West", as well.

For one group of commentators, Islam is the greatest threat to the future development of Western civilization and global peace. Democratization in Islamic

countries, based on the majority vote (that is in Western political doctrine considered the main yardstick of democratization of society) is seen as a way of "democratic enthronement extremely undemocratic regimes" of fundamentalist forces in Islamic countries.⁶¹ The rapid growth of the Muslim population in the world (over 1.5 billion) with the fast-growing Islamic minorities in Europe and the United States in the light of such beliefs is considered as a great threat to Western civilization.

These commentators reject to link the growth of radicalism in the Islamic countries with the model of production, political structure of society and the difficult economic and social position of the population in most Islamic countries. The main threat in their perception of Islamic radicalism comes with growing prosperity of Islamic countries, primarily in oil-exporting countries, that encourages more reminiscence of the ruling elite in the Islamic world to the great Islamic empire. Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey are the most prosperous Islamic countries in which radical Islam have great political power and influence on the political and social structure that gives legitimacy to reject the hypothesis that the socioeconomic status of the population has a defining role in radicalization of Islam. In support of the thesis that the radicalization of Islam cannot be brought into connection with poverty and lack of democratic institutions in the Islamic countries, these writers use statistic datas on the high degree of radicalization of Islamic migration in Europe and in USA, which reportedly enjoys a higher standard of living than the average living standard in countries of migration, and enjoys all the benefits of an institutionalized democratic society, as well. This group of authors indicate that radicalization of Islam is primarily associated with the rapid accumulation of capital in Islamic countries in the early 1970s when was a big oil boom that will encourage the phenomenon of historical reminiscences of the time of Islamic domination and rule of the Ottoman empire.

Large accumulation of "petro dollars" has improved free market capitalism and liberal democracy in Islamic countries that led to increase of living standards in the Islamic world. Spreading of liberal democracy, free market and raised of living standard in Islamic countries will inspire rivalry between Islam and the West. This will be one of the fundamental causes of the strengthening of political Islam and increase of Islamic radicalism.⁶²

Another group of scholars reject the validity of this thesis. The hypothesis that the spreading of market capitalism, liberal democracy and improving living standards of the population in Islamic countries encourages the radicalization of Islam, leading to a conflict between Islam and the West, is the thesis that cannot survive any serious criticism. First of all, it's hard to talk about the dominance of the free market and the capitalist mode of production and liberal democracy in Islamic countries. Growth of gross national income in some Islamic countries in terms growing of economic rents (oil wells), is unable to provide the dominance of the capitalist mode of production, or increasing living standards of the

population in Islamic countries. The failure to create a stable middle class in these countries leads to absence of potential economic competition between Islam and the West. Radicalization of Islam is the problem which arising from the mode of production in Islamic countries that produce dramatic problems in relationship between the state and society in these countries.⁶³

Since the global capital has penetrated into these countries, with pre-capitalist model of production, via global market rather than throughout capitalist production. The law of the capitalist mode of production has limited influence on economic development only on level of profit and the amount of rent. The relations of production in these countries remain outside of this influence. Under these conditions, the laws of the capitalist mode of production has been developed into a basic requirement playback feudal structure and "global capitalist market becomes a mechanism by which the feudal lords maintain control over certain production resources and thus ensure the domination and exploitation of people and also the means through which resists the subjection of production resources under capitalist relations of production.⁶⁴

The highest percent of population in Islamic countries lives in poverty.⁶⁵ The Requirement for social and economic reform was regularly followed with radicalization of the Islamic society, which only gave some sort of chances to the poor masses to respond to state's repression. Educated younger generations, mainly technical intelligence, have the option to support domestic pro-Western political elites, or to stay on economic and social margins. Such a position of young and educated generations in the Islamic world will lead them to claim social and political reform of Islamic society, that call for capitalist mode of production and new structure of relationship between state and society in the Islamic countries. Inability to perform these economic, social and political reforms produces high levels of radicalism in Islamic countries, leading to a radicalization of relationship between West and Islam.

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- ⁷ See more on global identity S.N. Eisenstadt and B. Giesen, "The Construction of Collective Identity", in *Archives of European Sociology* (vol. 56, 1995).
- ⁸ „Cultural identity was something people simpli 'had' as an undisturbed existential possession, an inheritance, a benefit of traditional long dwelling of continuity with the past. Identity, than, like langue, was not just description of cultural belonging; it was a sort of collective treasure of local communities. But it was also discovered to be something fragile that needed protecting and preserving, that could be lost.“ (John Tomlinson, Globalization and Cultural Identity, TGT2eC23, March 19, 2003, p. 269.
- ⁹ „By identity, as it refers to social actors, I understand the process od construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural atribute, or a related set of cultural attributes, that is given priority over other sources of meaning...identities can also be originated from dominant institutions, they become identities only when and if social actors internalize them, and construct their meaning around this internationalization.“ (Manuel Castells (2010), The Power of Identity, Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 6-7)
- ¹⁰ John Tomlinson (2003), Globalization and Cultural Identity, TGT2eC23, March 19, 2003, p. 271
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- ¹³ Francis Fukuyama (2002), The End of History and the last Man, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 2002, pp1-418
- ¹⁴ „Television news brings distant conflicts into the intimate spaces of our living-rooms, 'exotic' tastes become routinely mixed with domestic ones, assumptions we make about the health and security of our families now routinely factor in an awareness, however vague, of global contingencies such as environmental risk or stock-market stability. But we can add to these a more subtle examples of deterritorialization: precisely, the reach of the institutional-modern form of identity into cultural life“. (John Tomlinson, Globalization and Cultural Identity, TGT2eC23, March 19, 2003, pp. 273-74)
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- ²⁴ „For a Muslims, the fundamental attachment is not to the watan (home-land), but to the umma, or community of believers, all made equal in their submission to Allah. This universal confraternity supersedes the institutions of the nation-state, which is seen as a source of division among believers“. (Manuel Castells (2010), The Power of Identity, p15)
- ²⁵ “Identities are the basis of interest. Actors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead they define their interests in the process of defining situations.” (Aleksander Wendt, Anarchy in What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2. Spring 1992, p398.

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- ³⁴ Peter Katzenstein (ed. 1996), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press
- ³⁵ Today in Islam exist numerous factions and movements so that the Islamic spectrum represents a number of organizations, movements, teachings and sects. Here we present only one of the typology encountered in the literature on modern Islam: 1. Islamic Secularism; 2. Islamic Populism; 3. Islamic Philanthropist; 4. Islamic Spiritualism (Sufi Passivism, Sufi Activism); 5. Political Islamism Sunni: Puritan Traditionalist, Mainstream Gradualist, Revolutionary Messianic, Revolutionary Jihadist, Reformist Revisionist, Modernist Rationalist; 6. Political Islamist Shi'i: Revolutionary Marji'ist, Reformist Gradualist; 7. Official Islam; 8. Major Branches of Islam: Sunni, Ithna 'ashari, Isma'ili, Zaidi, Nusayri, Druz, Ibadi (R.Hrain Dekmejin, "Multiple Faces of Islam", in A. Jerichow and J. Beak Simonsen (eds. 1997), *Islam in Changing World*, str.3
- ³⁶ Mahmuda Faksh (1994), *The Prospects of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Post-Gulf War Period*, International Journal XLIX (Spring 1994), p186

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- ³⁷ The majority of Muslims are Sunni, being over 75–90% of all Muslims. The second largest sect, Shia, makes up 10–20%. About 13% of Muslims live in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country, 25% in South Asia, 20% in the Middle East, 2% in Central Asia, 4% in the remaining South East Asian countries, and 15% in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sizable communities are also found in China, Russia, and parts of Europe. With over 1.5 billion followers or over 22% of earth's population, Islam is the second-largest and one of the fastest-growing religions in the world.
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- ⁴⁰ “Islamic revivalism is in many ways the successor to failed nationalist programs. The founders of many Islamic movements were formerly participants in nationalist movements: Hasan al-Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Rashid Ghannoushi of Tunisia’s Renaissance party, and Abbasi Madani of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria.” (John L. Esposito, *Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace*, *Current History*, January 1994, p20)
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- ⁵⁰ Khaled Abou El-Fadl (2003), Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment, *Fordham International Law Journal*, Volume 27, Issue 1 2003 Article 2)
- ⁵¹ Abdeslam Maghraoui (2003), “Ambiguities of Sovereignty: Morocco, The Hague and the Western Sahara Dispute,” *Mediterranean Politics*, 2003, pp. 113-26.
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- ⁵³ Khaled Abou El-Fadl (2003), Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 27, Issue 1 2003 Article 2)
- ⁵⁴ “The Koran and other statements of Muslim beliefs contain few prohibitions on violence, and a concept of nonviolence is absent from Muslim doctrine and practice”. (Samuel Huntington (1998), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, London, p263)
- ⁵⁵ Iran vs. West Is War Inevitable in 2012. Conversation with Ambassador Jon Bolton, American Enterprise Institute, February 12, 2012,
- ⁵⁶ Brahma Chellaney (2011), America's Troubling Support for Oil-Rich Islamist Regimes, *The Japan Times*, Tuesday, November 2011.
- ⁵⁷ Mahmuda Faksh (1994), The Prospects of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Post-Gulf War Period, *International Journal XLIX* (Spring 1994), p193
- ⁵⁸ “Despite an appearance by Bush at a mosque after 9/11 to show he didn't hold all Muslims responsible, his administration proceeded to do exactly that: military trials for civilians, secret prisons, the detention of hundreds of Muslim men without charge, the torture and harsh interrogation of detainees and the invasions of two Muslim-majority countries”.(The Challenge of Being a Muslim in post- 9/11 America, *The Gardian*, Friday, 9. September 2011.
- ⁵⁹ Brahma Chellaney (2011), America's troubling support for oil-rich Islamist regimes, *The Japan Times*, Online, November 8, 2011)
- ⁶⁰ “Global entertainment companies shape understandings and dreams of ordinary citizens, wherever they live. It is no wonder to see a shepherd, in the middle of nowhere, humming a Michael Jackson tune! Are local Islamic cultures, then, inevitably falling victim to a global "consumer" culture? When one considers the distribution of indigenous forms of representation like the Friday-prayer sermon, one should be optimistic". (Wang Jieru (2003), *Options of Cultural Identification in Constructing Globalization: Global Culture or Cultural Globalization?*, Kunming Institute of Botany, Chinese Academy of Sciences)
- ⁶¹ Judit Miler (1993), The Challenge of Radical Islam, *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993., SBN News Arab Spring Push for Islamic Caliphate, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0uLXnft9rxU>, visited March 15, 2012.
- ⁶² Daniel Pipes (2002), *God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam*, National Interest, winter 2002.
- ⁶³ “Another aspect of the weakness of the state is the social-economic one as the Arab state has failed to support and sustain the masses and their basic needs. This evidenced by the stunning fact that despite Arab oil wealth, the per capita GDP for all the Arab states grew by less than 0.5 percent annually from 1980 to 2004. As for industrialization, Arab countries were less industrialized in 2007 than in 1970, and unemployment among the young, which is over 60 percent for those under the age of 25, is among the highest in the world. The overall poverty rate is almost 50 percent”. (David Bukay, “Arab Spring” Delusions, *ACDemocracy*, December 20, 2013).

⁶⁴ Harold Wolpe (1980), *The Articulation of Modes of Production*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

⁶⁵ Around 1.7 billion people are living below the poverty line. Amongst them 44 percent are residing in Muslim countries. (The Nation, Saturday 29. June, 2013).